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TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION IN LIGHT OF THE
FOSTER CARE CRISIS:
A HORSE OF A DIFFERENT COLOR

This Note focuses on the convergence of two social concerns:
transracial adoption (TRA)1 and the ever increasing numbers of
minority children entering and remaining in the foster care system.2
While everyone would agree that the latter is a tragedy and needs to
be corrected, more divisive opinions surround the role of transracial
adoption in child placement.
This Note will address the current status and potential
resolution of these often competing concerns. A general background
will first be presented regarding the role and treatment of transracial

' "[Although] the term 'transracial adoption' refers to the placement of black children
with white families and also encompasses placing white children with black families,
transracial adoption, in practice, has been largely a one-way street involving the
placement of black children with white families . . . ." Memorandum from Benjamin
L. Hooks, Executive Director, National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People to All NAACP Units, National Board Members and NAACP/SCF Trustees 6
(June 3, 1992) (on file with the New York Law School Journalof Human Rights). For
a discussion of the transracial adoption controversy see Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do
Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race Matching In Adoption, 139 U. PA. L.
REV. 1163 (1991) (providing a detailed examination of current racial matching policies
and the effect such policies may have on minority adoptions in both legal and social
contexts). See also Twila B. Perry, Race and Child Placement: The Best Interests Test
And The Cost Of Discretion, 29 J. FAM. L. 51 (1990-91) (concluding that the traditiona,
approach used to determine child placement is inappropriate where child and potential
parents are of different races and finding the "best interests" test allows judges and child
placement agencies to make decisions based on questionable attitudes and assumptions
about the role of race in child placement).
2 See SELECT CoMM. ON CHILDREN, YoUTH AND FAMILIES, No PLACE TO CALL
HOME: DISCARDED CHmDREN IN AMERICA, H.R. REP. No. 395, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
38-39 (1990) [hereinafter DISCARDED CHILDREN] (percentage of minority children in
foster care rose from 41% in 1985 to 46% in 1988, more than twice the percentage of
minority children in the national child population).
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adoption in recent history.3 Next, two major events in the area of
child placement that occurred almost simultaneously in the mid-1980s
will be described and discussed.4 An analysis of recent transracial
adoption cases will attempt to ascertain the role courts are willing to

play in the transracial adoption debate.' Current adoption and foster
care agency practices will be examined in light of the debate
surrounding transracial adoption and the crisis in the foster care
system. 6 Special attention will be focused toward analyzing new
responses to the foster care problems facing minority children and the
potential role transracial adoption may have in treating these
problems. In conclusion, this Note will examine the effectiveness of
the current actions being taken to address the foster care crisis and
will attempt to offer constructive suggestions toward correcting the
problems.

L Background
Longstanding and deeply entrenched separation of the races
in this country has traditionally permeated attitudes toward transracial

adoption.7 Most states had statutes prohibiting adoption across racial
lines.' With the arrival of the Civil Rights Movement racially
discriminatory legislation came under fire and most of those statutes
were repealed or struck down as unconstitutional.9 The last statutes
infra notes 7-49 and accompanying text.
infra notes 50-112 and accompanying text.
infra notes 113-76 and accompanying text.
infra notes 177-242 and accompanying text.
generally Bartholet, supra note 1, at 1174-85 for an in-depth discussion of the
history of transracial adoption.
Bartholet, supra note 1, at 1176. For example, a Louisiana statute in force in the
3 See
'See
S See
See
7See

1960s stated: "A single person over the age of twenty-one years, or a married couple
jointly, may petition to adopt any child of his or their race." Compos v. McKeithen,
341 F. Supp. 264, 264 (E.D. La. 1972) (quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9.422 (West
1965)).
9See, e.g., Compos v. McKeithen, 341 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. La. 1972). In Compos,
the court invalidated a Louisiana statute prohibiting transracial adoption, holding that the
statute did not withstand equal protection scrutiny. Id. at 268. The court ruled that
Louisiana had failed to show the necessity or reasonableness of requiring a parent or
parents to be of the same race as the child to be adopted. Id. For the text of the statute,
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prohibiting transracial adoption to give way to constitutional
challenges were those of Texas1" in 1967, and Louisiana" in 1972.
The courts were also influenced by racial bias regarding
transracial adoption. ' There is very little case law directly involving
transracial adoption. Many of the cases that are typically cited with
reference to transracial adoption fall under the heading of "child
placement," mostly child custody suits resulting from divorce, that
are analogous to transracial adoption by virtue of their treatment of
race. Perhaps the most blatantly racially biased of all child placement
decisions involving the issue of race is Ward v. Ward." The Ward
court held that the biracial children of a black man and a white
woman should remain with their father, since they appeared black. 14
The court did not assess the fitness of the mother as custodian of the
children in its opinion; the inquiry began and ended with the physical
characteristics shared by the children and their father. 5
While Ward stands out as a supremely racist example among
child placement cases, other courts have revealed similar biases in a
less strident fashion. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed the district court's denial of a petition for
adoption in In re Adoption of a Minor. 6 The district court refused
to grant a black man's petition for adoption of his white step-son, in
part because the court feared "[t]he boy when he grows up might lose
the social status of a white man by reason of the fact that by record
his father will be a negro if this adoption is approved." 17 In Potter

see supra note 8. See also In re Gomez, 424 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967). In
Gomez, the court invalidated a Texas statute reading "[nio white child can be adopted
by a negro person, nor can a negro child be adopted by a white person." Id. at 657
(quoting TEX. REV. Cl. STAT. ANN. art. 46a § 8 (Vernon 1959)).
'o See In re Gomez, 424 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
"See Compos v. McKeithen, 341 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. La. 1972).
1 See generally Bartholet, supra note 1, at 1177-78 for a thorough treatment of early
transracial child placement cases.
" 216 P.2d 755 (Wash. 1950).
14 Id. at 756.
15 Id.
'" 228

F.2d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1955).

17Id. at 447 (quoting and reversing unpublished memorandum opinion of District

Court of Columbia).
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v. Potter"8 the trial court denied a petition for custody modification
made by a white mother who had remarried a black man after her
divorce from her child's father, a white man. 19 The court proceeded
to cast aspersions on the mother's character and mental stability,

seemingly on the basis of her interracial marriage.20 A more detailed
examination of other cases reveals similar racial biases permeating
child placement cases.2"
Conversely, some courts of the same era spoke out against the
prevalent racist attitudes promoted by society. The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the
decision of the district court in In re Adoption of a Minor,22 holding
that the factor of race alone may not justify the denial of a petition
for adoption; race is only one of many considerations to be addressed24
in the context of an adoption petition.' In Fountaine v. Fountaine,
an Illinois court reversed the court's award of custody of biracial
children to their black father, finding that the lower court's decision
rested solely on the physical resemblance of the children to their

IS

127 N.W.2d 320 (Mich. 1964).

I9 at 326. The original custody decree, which granted legal custody of the child
Id.
to her father and physical custody to her maternal grandparents, was affirmed. Id.
20 Id. The dissenting opinion contradicts the dim picture of the mother painted by
the trial judge and accepted by the Michigan Supreme Court. The dissent notes:
From all appearances, fife with her mother and stepfather in
California will be based upon a bedrock of parental love and
cooperation, something hitherto denied her. Her stepfather is a
surgeon in a wholesome community where experiences in democratic
living are promising. There is a substantial home sustained by
adequate income. All this and a full time mother, too.
Id. at 328.
21 See,

e.g., Beazley v. Davis, 545 P.2d 206 (Nev. 1976) (trial court ruled that

children should remain with their black father, not their white mother, because of their
shared physical characteristics); In re Baker, 185 N.E.2d 51 (Ohio 1962) (probate court
erred by denying transracial adoption based on rationale that God never intended that the
races should be mixed).
2 228 F.2d 446, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
1 Id.
24 133 N.E.2d 532 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1956).
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father.25 Another Illinois court recognized in a subsequent case that
"race alone cannot outweigh all other considerations and be decisive"
in child placement cases.2"
In In Re R.M. G. ,27 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
remanded the case to the lower court, which had granted adoption to
paternal grandparents of a black girl that had been in the foster care
of a white family for the majority of her two years.2" The appellate
court articulated a three-part analysis that a trial court should
undertake in an inter-racial adoption case where race is a relevant
factor.29 The court instituted this analysis to "assure a reviewing
court that the application of [the race] factor, in conjunction with
other relevant considerations, was precisely tailored to the best
interest of the child." 3 ° In Re R.M. G. is significant not for the threepart test it enunciated, which was later repudiated," but for the
court's concern that race not be allowed to transcend other factors in
adoption proceedings.

II. A Brief Rise in Transracial Adoptions
In the late 1960s and early 1970s transracial adoption figures
rose dramatically, from a record high of 733 in 1968 to 2574 in
1971.32 There are different explanations for this "phenomenon."33
Id. at 534. The court noted that the trial judge "would have awarded the custody
of the children to the mother except that they had the appearance of colored children."
Id.
' Langin v. Langin, 276 N.E.2d 822, 824 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971).
27 454 A.2d 776 (D.C. App. 1982).
2 Id. at 794.
29Id.
' Id.
" In Re D.I.S., 494 A.2d 1316, 1327 (D.C. App. 1985). "The three-part approach
in R.M.G. [ ] is unwise primarily because it effectuates a sharp departure from the
flexible framework developed in our decisions for determining the best interests of the
child." Id.
32 RITA SIMON & HOWARD ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION 29-30 (1977).
' Even at its peak, transracial adoptions constituted a minute portion of black and
other minority adoptions. Jacqueline Macaulay & Stewart Macaulay, Adoptionfor Black
Children: A Case Study of Expert Discretion, 1 RES. IN L. AND Soc. 265, 284-85
(1978).
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The Korean War resulted in many mixed-race children, born to black
American soldiers and Korean women, who needed families. 34 As
Americans began to adopt these children, the concept of white people
adopting a black child seemed less alien and even desirable to a
liberal generation dedicated to racial harmony. 5
This brief period of greater acceptance toward transracial
adoptions ended in 1972, when the National Association of Black
Social Workers (NABSW) denounced transracial adoption as cultural
genocide. 6 The organization announced its stance at a meeting in St.
Louis and issued a position paper. 7 The stance taken by the
NABSW echoes the rise of the Black Power Movement. This period
in the early 1970s was characterized by racial selfcompartmentalization, rejection of Civil Rights era integrationist
principles, and aggressive pursuit of racial justice." The primary
objective of the group's firm stance against transracial adoption was
to promote black children's awareness of and pride in their heritage,39
something the NABSW claimed would be impossible if black children
were placed in white homes.4 ° The group also declared that black
children reared in white homes would be unable to deal effectively
with the problems faced by blacks in a racist society.41 The
NABSW's unwavering mandate, issued to promote its goals, was that
black children must never be placed in white homes under any
circumstance.4 2 Recruitment and rehabilitation of black families was
stressed as the logical and necessary answer to placement of black

Bartholet, supra note 1, at 1178.
3 See id.
3' See NABSW Opposes Trans-Racial Adoption, NAT'L Ass'N OF BLACK SOCIAL

WORKERS NEWS (Nat'l Ass'n of Black Social Workers, New York, N.Y.), Apr. 1972,
at 1-2 [hereinafter NABSW Position Paper].
37 Id.
38

See ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE,

UNEQUAL 62-64 (1992). Hacker offers a description and explanation of the wane of the

Civil Rights Movement, the origin of militant black activism, and the effects this
transition has had on relations between blacks and whites. Id.
" NABSW Position Paper, supra note 36, at 1-2.
40 id.at 1.
41 Id.at 2.
42 Id.
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children.43
Foster care and adoption agencies quickly aligned themselves
with the position of the NABSW. 4 Agencies that had actively
encouraged transracial placement denounced the policy and began to
create new agency rules and practices that would render transracial
adoption almost impossible.45 After the NABSW position was
4
announced, the number of transracial adoptions decreased sharply.
Race-matching policies were created that still exist today .4 The
commitment to same-race matching has even resulted in black
children remaining in the foster care system while a white family has
48
expressed interest in serving as a foster care or adoptive family.
This type of single-mindedness in matching children with families of
the same race, often at the expense of the child who must wait longer
to join a family, is the biggest criticism of NABSW-spawned
prohibitions against transracial adoption.49
43 Id.

"See infra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
45 Compare CHILD WELFARE LEAOUE OF AMERICA, STANDARDS FOR ADOPTION
SERVICE § 4.5 (1973) ("It is preferable to place children in families of their own racial
background.")
with CHILD WELFARE LEAOUE OF AMERICA, STANDARDS FOR
ADOPTION SERVICE § 4.5 (1968) ("In most communities there are families who have the
capacity to adopt a child.whose racial background is different from their own. Such
couples should be encouraged to consider such a child.").
"Transracial adoption figures decreased from 2574 in 1971 to 1056 in 1975. See
Arnold Silverman & Wiliam Feigelman, The Adjustment of Black ChildrenAdopted by
White Families, 62 Soc. CASEWORK: J. OF CoNTEMP. Soc. WORK 529 (1981).
' See, e.g., Michael D'Antonio, Sad Goodbye to Michael, NEWSDAY (Nassau and
Suffolk ed.), Apr. 1, 1988, at 3 (New York State requires that adoption agencies
consider matching race, religion, and ethnicity in adoption cases. Going above and
beyond state law, Little Flower Children's Services, the largest adoption agency on Long
Island, has adopted a policy of strict race-matching in adoptions and does not allow
transracial placement except in cases of short term emergency foster care.)
' See Ilene Barth, What Does NY Have Against Mixed-Race Adoptions?, NEWSDAY
(City ed.), Mar. 5, 1989, Ideas, at 1, 8. Barth relates the story of a white New York
couple who wished to adopt a child from the "Blue Book," a directory of hard-to-place
children available for adoption. Blue Book children are difficult to place because they
are older, have handicaps, or have siblings. The couple's request to adopt a boy was
denied because the child was biracial and the agency in charge of the child's placement
followed a strict race-matching policy. The child remained unadopted for two years
after the couple's request was denied. Id.
49 Charles A. Radin, Waiting For A Home, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 30, 1989, at 1,
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IlI. Two Events in the Mid-1980s
Regarding Transraclal Adoption

A. Palmore v. Sidotd
In 1984 the Supreme Court made a rare foray into the
traditionally state-regulated area of child placement.
Palmore
involved a custody dispute between a white divorced couple."s The

child's mother had been granted custody upon the divorce. 2 The
mother lived with a black man, whom she married shortly after the
child's father sought custody modification. 3 The lower court
awarded custody to the father,' finding that the mother had "chosen
for herself and for her child, a life-style unacceptable to the father
and to society"Os and that the societal pressures the child would feel
because she had a mother and stepfather of different races justified a
change in custody.56
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court. 7
The Court acknowledged that the "best interests of the child" test
used by the lower court was the proper test to determine child

placement.58 The Court determined, however, that the lower court

had impermissibly based its decision on the effects of racial prejudice
and would have arrived at a different result had the mother remarried
a white man.59 Recognizing that the child might indeed be subject to

'o 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
s Id. at 430.
52 id.
"' Id. Sidoti sought custody modification on the grounds of changed conditions;
namely, that his child's mother was cohabiting with a black man. Id.
Id. at 43 1.
s Palmore, 466 U.S. at 431. The trial court found the fact that Mrs. Palmore had
lived with her future second husband without being married to him showed that she
"tended to place gratification of her own desires ahead of her concern for the child's
future welfare." Id.
m id.
7 Id. at 434.

8 Id. at 432.
" Id. "[lit is clear that the outcome would have been different had petitioner
married a Caucasian male of similar respectability." Id.
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racial biases,' the Court nonetheless proclaimed that "[tihe
Constitution cannot control such prejudices, but neither can it tolerate
61
them. ,
Palmore, despite the use of strong constitutional rhetoric, does
not provide firm guidelines for the consideration of race in child
placement decisions. 62 The decision is encouraging primarily because
the Supreme Court found the overt racism contained in the lower
court's opinion worthy of intervention, although family matters are
usually left to the individual states. While lower courts grapple with
the impact of Palmore on child placement decisions, the Supreme
Court has not heard another case involving race and child placement

since. 63
B. Effect of Palmore on Child Placement
There is disagreement among experts as to the effect Palmore
has had on child placement decisions where race is a factor."

60Id. at 429.

61Pabnore, 433 U.S. at 433.
62 The language chosen by the Supreme Court in Palnorewas quite narrow: "The
effects of racial prejudice, however real, cannot justify a racial classification removing
an infant child from the custody of its natural mother found to be an appropriate person
to have such custody." Id. at 434 (footnote omitted). Thus, in its narrowest
interpretation, Pabnorecan be viewed as a decision pertaining to custody modification
suits between natural parents.
'6See J.H.H. and S.C.H. v. O'Hara, 878 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1072 (1990); Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't, 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir.
1977) (en bane), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978).
" See generally Perry, supra note 1, at 52-58. Perry argues that the best interests
standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Palmore is ambiguous as a practical matter
in child placement cases:
[l]n child placement decision-making where racial differences are
present, the touchstone rule of custody - the best interests rule - does
little to assist in analyzing or resolving the different issues often
presented. Although the rule is intended to be a multi-factor
balancing test, it may often allow race inappropriately to achieve a
dominant position. The rule affords a level of discretion by courts
and agencies that permits decisions to be made on the basis of
personal biases, unsupported assumptions, and incomplete analyses
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Palmore did not hold that race may never enter into a child custody
decision; rather, it may not be the sole basis for the court's
decision. , 5 Various critics of this guideline have charged that race
continues to dominate child placement decisions, but the practice is
often camouflaged by the courts."
The court in Holt v. Chenault 67 found that the trial court had
erred by taking account of racial biases in its decision to grant a
white father's petition for modification of custody of his daughter
upon the marriage of his ex-wife, also white, to a black man. 8 The
trial court had determined that the mother was a suitable parent, and
its modification of the original custody decree was found inconsistent
with Kentucky law by the Kentucky Supreme Court.69 The law
regarding modification of a custody decree stated that modification
will only be upheld when a change of circumstances is necessary to
serve the best interests of the child. 7" The reviewing court found no
such change of circumstances.71
The court did affirm that the child's emotional reaction to her
mother's biracial marriage was a proper factor to be considered in

that are often insensitive to the range of children's needs and that
ignore other important interests.
Id. at 51. James Bowen concludes that the best interest standard does allow for
consideration of race in child custody contexts, by restricting Palmore's holding to its
particular facts of custody modification between former spouses. According to Bowen,
In re R.M. G. provides the proper utilization of the race factor in those cases where two
potential adoptive families, one black and one white, possess equivalent adoptive
qualifications. James S. Bowen, Cultural Convergences and Divergences: The Nexus
Between Putative Afro-American Family Values and the Best Interests of the Child, 26
J. FAM. L. 487, 521 (1987-88).
' Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 434 (1984).
6Perry, supra note 1, at 54 n.121.
67 722 S.W.2d 897 (Ky. 1987).
0 Id. at 898.
69Id.
70 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.340(2) (Michie 1991). The statute provides that a
court, in deciding custody modifications "shall retain the custodian appointed pursuant
to the prior decree unless: ... (c) The child's present environment endangers seriously
his physical, mental, moral, or emotional health, and the harm likely to be caused by a
change of environment is outweighed by its advantages to him." Id.
71 Holt, 722 S.W.2d at 898.
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determining the child's best interests.72 The child was extremely
upset by the racial slurs of her classmates and expressed a strong
desire to live with her father. 73 Thus the Kentucky court, in effect,
took racial biases into account 74 -- contrary to its bold assertion that
consideration of race in child custody cases was impermissible.75
More positive, or perhaps less confusing, post-Palmore
77
decisions include Petition of D.LS. 76 and McLaughlin v. Pernsley.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Petition of D.LS.
affirmed the trial court, which had granted a petition for adoption of
a neglected black child by her natural grandmother instead of the
white foster family that she had lived with almost exclusively since
she was an infant. 78 The court did not focus solely on race in
arriving at its decision; 79 much attention was paid to the psychological
bonding that had occurred between the child and the foster mother,80
the large support network provided by the child's natural
grandmother and relatives,81 and a change in circumstances of her
foster family.8 2 The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision to grant the adoption petition of the child's natural
grandmother only after a thorough analysis of all the factors
involved.83 The decision was a true example of the "best interests"
standard strictly applied without undue emphasis placed on race."
In McLaughlin v. Pernsley,"5 a neglected black infant was

72Id.
71Id.
74Id.
IId. ("We hold that the trial court erred by giving effect to private racial biases.").
76494 A.2d 1316 (D.C. App. 19'85).
'n 693 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Pa. 1988), aftd, 876 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1989).
7' Petition of D.I.S., 494 A.2d at 1327.
79 Id.at 1323-24.
8o Id.at 1324.
81 Id.

SId.

Id. at 1323-24.
From the perspective of transracial adoption proponents, the court's emphasis on
"the trauma [the child] would face in adolescence in searching for her roots if placed
with [her foster family]" is problematic. See infra notes 200-216 and accompanying
text.
85 693 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
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placed for emergency foster care with the McLaughlins, a white
couple.86 The child remained with the family for two years, until he
was removed by the Philadelphia Department of Human Services and
placed with a black foster care family. 87 Although the caseworker in
charge of the placement had consistently evaluated the placement
positively, 88 agency policy was to place children in same-race
homes.89 The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
found that removal of the child violated both the McLaughlins' and
the child's equal protection rights,' that the child's best interests
mandated that he be returned to the McLaughlins' care, 91 and that
both the child and the McLaughlins would suffer irreparable injury
if the child was not returned. 92
Most notably, the court in McLaughlin applied strict scrutiny
to the actions of the Department of Human Services.93 Determining
that the agency had removed the child from the McLaughlins' care
solely on the basis of racial considerations, the court declared that the
removal must serve a compelling governmental interest and be
narrowly tailored to achieving that interest.9 The court found that
the state's interest in providing a long-term foster care placement that
takes into account a child's racial and cultural needs, in keeping with
the child's best interests, is indeed a compelling governmental
interest. 95 The court, however, did not agree that the means used to
achieve the governmental interest in question was sufficiently
narrowly tailored to survive a strict scrutiny analysis.96 The court
concluded that "[t]he use of race alone in making long-term foster
care placements is not necessary nor appropriate to accomplish those
Id. at 321-22.
Id. at 321.
Id. at 326-27 (citing Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 1 at trial).
McLaughlin, 693 F. Supp. at 324.
9 Id. at 332.
9'Id. at 353.
92id.

Id. at 330.
Id. The strict scrutiny standard of review originated in Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding that the governmental interest behind the statute
in question must be compelling to pass the strict scrutiny standard of review).
"McLaughlin, 693 F. Supp. at 331.
6 Id.
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salutary governmental objectives stated above. "97 Since the same-race
placement policy did not pass constitutional muster, the court held
that the Department of Human Services' decision to remove the child
from the McLaughlins' care on the basis of race alone violated the
equal protection rights of the McLaughlins and the child.9"
McLaughlin is an encouraging decision in the area of child
placement. Same race placement policies were not allowed to eclipse
what should always be the primary concern of those charged with
handling child placement; the child's best interests. Also significant
was the court's use of equal protection analysis in an area that most
courts are reluctant to handle at all."
In striking contrast with the decision in McLaughlin is the
extremely narrow interpretation of the Palmore holding by the Eight
Circuit in J.H.H. and S. C.H. v. O'Hara.1' Plaintiffs were a white
couple licensed by the state of Missouri as foster care providers. 0 1
The couple filed suit against the Missouri Division of Family Services
under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for monetary damages, claiming a
violation of their equal protection rights."° The couple claimed that
the Division of Family Services' decision not to return two black
foster children to their care was based solely on race. 0 3 The district
court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim on grounds of qualified

McLaughlin, 693 F. Supp. at 332.
s Id. at 327.
"See, e.g., In re D.L., 486 N.W.2d 375, 379 (Minn. 1992) (refusing to address the
equal protection issue because "statutes are presumptively constitutional" and should be
declared unconstitutional "when absolutely necessary and with extreme caution.");
J.H.H. and S.C.H. v. O'Hara, 878 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1072 (1990) (deciding case on qualified immunity grounds, rendering constitutional
analysis of plaintiff's equal protection claims unnecessary).
"o878 F.2d. 240, 245 (8th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 241. Plaintiffs held a provisional Foster Family Group Home license. Id.
'Id. at 240.
1I Id.
The children were removed from the plaintiffs' home so the Division of
Family Services could investigate a hot-line report alleging abuse by plaintiffs of other
of the plaintiffs' foster children. Subsequent investigation by a juvenile officer supported
the allegation, but the perpetrator of the abuse was not identified in the investigation
report. Upon removal from plaintiffs' home, the children were placed with a black
foster family, where they remained after the child abuse investigation had concluded.
However, two white foster children were returned to plaintiffs' care. Id. at 241.
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immunity,"' and the Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the
claim was not based on a clearly established constitutional right."0 5

The plaintiffs relied on Palmore for the proposition that race
may not play any role in child placement cases, whether in custody
modifications or in foster care placements. " The plaintiffs argued
that the decision in McLaughlin v. Pernsley buttressed this extension
of the Palmore holding into the area of foster care placement.107 The
Eighth Circuit factually distinguished McLaughlin from the case
before it.108 One major difference between the two cases, according
to the court, was that the actions by the foster care agency in
McLaughlin was removal of the foster child, as opposed to in the
instant case the factor was the failure to place children with the same
family that they were placed with originally." °
The court of appeals likewise found the reliance on Palmore
misplaced, claiming "[w]e decline to read Palmore as a broad
proscription against the consideration of race in matters of child

"4 J.H.H., 878 F.2d at 240. The defense of qualified immunity protects government
officials who perform their discretionary duties in good faith. "[Cifficials performing
discretionary functions [ ] generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
818 (1981). Using this standard, the district court determined that the plaintiffs failed
to show that the Division of Family Services' decision was made in bad faith when it
acted according to Missouri Division of Family Services regulations. The district court
granted the Division's motion for summary judgment without prejudice, however, to
enable plaintiffs to reopen the case in order to seek equitable remedies. J.H.H., 878
F.2d at 243.
los J.H.H., 878 F.2d at 240.
'0 Id. at 244. "Plaintiffs find a factual correspondence between Pabnore and the
instant case in the State's common policy objective: in foster care placement
determinations, as in custody determinations, the standard applied is the best interests
of the child." Id.
107 See id.
108Id. at 245.
"o'Id. This is a very puzzling distinction, since the net result in both McLaughlin
and J.H.H. was that the plaintiffs were denied the chance to continue in their roles as
foster parents by the agencies in charge of the placements. The court also distinguished
McLaughlin by noting that the plaintiffs in that case sought a preliminary injunction, as
opposed to the plaintiffs in J.H.H., who were seeking monetary damages under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Id.
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custody and foster care placement.""' Hypothesizing that even if
Palmore could be extended to apply to foster care placement
decisions, the court found that "at most, the precedent establishes that
race may not be the sole factor in determining the best interests of the
child.""' Emphasizing that because the plan for the foster children
was eventual reunification with their natural father, the court found
an application of Palmore to prevent consideration of race in
determining the best interests of the children singularly
inappropriate.112
IV. Recent Cases Involving TRA
In re D.L."' involved a custody battle between D.L.'s
grandparents, who were black, and the white foster parents who
cared for her since shortly after her birth. 1 ' At trial, the judge
granted the maternal grandparents' petition for adoption, pursuant to
a statutory preference for family members in minority adoptions."' 5

10

J.H.H., 878 F.2d at 245.

" Id.
112 Id.
113 486 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. 1992).
114 Id. at 377. D.L.'s mother had provided false information to the foster care and
adoption agency, who were thus unable to locate any of D.L.'s extended family. D.L.'s
mother also refused to tell her parents of D.L.'s birth until two months after her birth.
Her maternal grandparents were unable to locate D.L. until she was a year old. One
month later, the Hennepin County Juvenile Court terminated the parental rights of both
of D.L.'s parents, leaving D.L. a ward of the state in the custody of her foster parents.
At this time the maternal grandparents informed the county that they wished to adopt
D.L. Id.
' Id. at 376. MINN. STAT. § 259.28 subd. 2 (1990) provides the statutory
preference for family members in minority adoptions:
The policy of the state of Minnesota is to ensure that the
best interests of children are met by requiring due consideration of
the child's minority race or minority ethnic heritage in adoption
placements. .

.

. In the adoption of a child of minority racial or

minority ethnic heritage, in reviewing adoptive placement, the court
shall consider preference, and in determining appropriate adoption,
the court shall give preference, in the absence of good cause to the
contrary, to (a) a relative or relatives of the child, or, if that would
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On appeal, the court of appeals ruled the statute unconstitutional on
equal protection clause grounds. 116 However, the court went on to
affirm the trial court's decision granting the grandparents' petition,
finding that the reasoning used by117
the trial court was sound even
absent its application of the statute.
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of both
lower courts, ruling that D.L. should be placed for adoption with her
grandparents. 1 8 The court held that placement with relatives is
presumptively in a child's best interest, without addressing the
constitutional issue raised in the court below. 19 Finding that "a
strong family preference exists for all child placements, without
regard to race or ethnic heritage," 2 ' the court declined to invade the
province of the legislature by weighing the validity of the statute.'
The most troubling aspect of D.L., from the perspective of
transracial adoption advocates, is that the Minnesota Supreme Court
affirmed the procedure used by the trial court for application of the
family placement presumption.'
In light of the presumption, the
trial court considered only the adoption petition of the
grandparents. 123 The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld this practice,
noting that "[w]hen a presumption exists in favor of one petitioner
over another, and there is no reason to believe that the favored

be detrimental to the child or a relative is not available, to (b) a
family with the same racial or ethnic heritage as the child ....
In re D.L., 486 N.W.2d at 376.
6 In re D.L., 479 N.W.2d 408, 413 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).

The appellate court

ruled that the statute's racial classification failed a strict scrutiny analysis, since the
classification was not necessary to achieve the goals of the legislature. "The heritage of
minority children can be protected without the classification by making the preferences
for relatives applicable to all children, as the legislature has directed in related statutes."

Id.
17 Id.

at 415-16.

". In

re D.L., 486 N.W.2d 375, 377 (Minn. 1992). "Mhe trial court did not
employ the exact analysis we have set out today, but after a careful review of the record
we find substantial support for the trial court's conclusions." Id. at 381.
119
Id. at 379.
12o id.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 380.
'2

In re D.L., 486 N.W.2d at 380.
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petition will not prevail, judicial time and litigants' resources can be
conserved by a single proceeding." 24
The dissenting judge on the court of appeals sharply criticized
this practice, noting that "by preliminarily barring evidence in support
of appellants' [the foster parents] petition, the trial court rendered it
impossible to make a reasoned determination of D.L.'s best interests
based on all of the relevant evidence.""2 5 The dissent found this loss
of evidence particularly significant since additional evidence on the
harms that may occur when the primary caretaker bond is broken
might have influenced the court's ruling on the amount of weight to
accord the possibility of such damage, influencing the determination
126
of D.L.'s best interests.
In Re D.L. is an extremely conservative opinion when
contrasted with McLaughlin v. Pernsley.12
The distinguishing
characteristic between the two cases is that the constitutional issue in
D.L. involved a statute, 2 ' while the challenge in McLaughlin was
based on an agency policy. 129 Thus, the presumption that statutes are
constitutional' 3 might explain the different outcomes of the two
24 d.at 381. The court allowed the foster parents to intervene in the proceeding,
but any evidence they were permitted to introduce was limited to the issue of good
cause. Id.
" In re D.L., 479 N.W.2d 408, 416 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (Schumacher, J.,
dissenting).
'2 Id. At trial, the experts called by both the grandparents and the foster parents
agreed that removing D.L. from her foster parents would cause her intense pain in the
short-term. The trial court agreed with the grandparents' expert, however, that over
time, in a warm family environment, D.L.'s pain would heal. Id. at 414. Joseph
Goldstein, an expert in the field of child custody, would vigorously contest the dismissal
of the pain D.L. would feel upon removal from her foster parents, especially since D.L.
was quite young at the time of the proceedings. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL.,
BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD, 31-32 (1973) [hereinafter BEYOND THE
BEST INTERESTS]. See also infra notes 220-22 and accompanying text.
227 693 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Pa. 1988), af'd, 876 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1989). For a
discussion of McLaughlin, see supra notes 85-99 and accompanying text.
' In re D.L., 486 N.W.2d 375, 376 (Minn. 1992).
'2 McLaughlin, 693 F. Supp. 318, 319 (E.D. Pa. 1988), aft'd, 876 F.2d 308 (3d
Cir. 1989).
130 The Supreme Court has stated that it

has the power to declare an act of Congress to be repugnant to the
Constitution and therefore invalid. But the duty is one of great

164

JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS

[Vol. X

cases. Yet there is something troubling about the Minnesota Supreme
Court's opinion. As the dissenting justice on the court of appeals
noted, the procedural posture of the case did seem to limit the court's
Intuitively it makes sense to
inquiry of D.L.'s best interests.'
examine both the circumstances of the grandparents and the foster
parents to determine as best as possible what arrangement would be
most beneficial to D.L.
In Gloria G. the black adoptive mother of a biracial child
filed a personal injury action on behalf of the child for damages that
she claimed were caused by the Kansas City Department of Social

and Rehabilitation Services' (Department) removal of the child from
a foster care home. 132 The child, A., had lived with foster families
for most of his life,' 33 and with the Goza family, who was white, for
the longest period of time -- four years.' 34 After 16 months with the
Gozas, severance of the parental rights of A.'s biological parents
became final, thus freeing A. for adoption and enabling the
Department to develop plans for permanent placement for A.' 35
The Department's goals for A. and his brother were adoption

delicacy, and only to be performed where the repugnancy is clear,
and the conflict irreconcilable. Every doubt is to be resolved in
favor of the constitutionality of the law.
Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. 247,250 (1868). See also Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700,
719 (1878) ("every possible presumption is in favor of the validity of a statute.").
"' In re D.L., 479 N.W.2d 408, 416 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (Schumacher, J.,
dissenting).
32 Gloria G. v. State Dept. of Soc. and Rehabilitation Servs., 83 P.2d 979, 980
(Kan. 1992).
'3 A., along with his older biological brother, was removed from the custody of his
abusive and neglectful biological parents at the age of 11 months. Id. at 981.
" Id. A. was born in January 1975. After being removed from his parents at the
age of 11 months, A. was placed in the custody of the Department of Social and
Rehabilitation Services. A.'s first foster family, the Nelsons, kept him for six months.
A. was placed with another foster family, and then returned very briefly to his biological
mother's care. A. was again removed from his mother, suffering from child abuse. A.
was hospitalized as a result of multiple injuries. After his release from the hospital A.
was placed with the Gozas, at the end of July 1976, removed for a month in August, and
returned to the Gozas, where he remained for four years. These events all took place
before A.'s sixth birthday. Id.
135Id. A.'s brother, who was placed with another foster family, was also freed for
adoption. Id.
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by a biracial or African-American two-parent family, preferably
outside the Kansas City metropolitan area, where the boys' biological
family continued to reside.136 Both the Gozas and the black foster
mother of A.'s brother wished to adopt both boys.' 37 The
Department found both potential adoptive families to be
inappropriate 3 ' and continued to search for an adoptive family. 39
The boys were referred to various black adoption agencies over the
next two years without success. 14° At this point, the Department
planned to pursue adoption by the boys' foster parents, pending
completion of adoptive home studies.141
Before the Goza home study was completed, however, the
Department removed A., after Mrs. Goza reported an incident of
sexual manipulation involving A. and the Goza's 12 year-old
daughter.142 The Department's Protective Services Unit investigated
the report and concluded that sexual abuse had occurred. 43 At the
time of his removal from. the Goza home, A. was five years old and
had lived with the family for four years.'"
Three months after removal from the Gozas A. was placed
with Gloria G., a single African-American woman, who formally
adopted A. in March of 1982.' In November 1985, Gloria G. filed
an action for damages against the Department, claiming that the
Department had not disclosed A.'s emotional and behavioral problems
'3

Gloria G., 833 P.2d at 981.

37 id.

"3The Department's reasoning was that the Gozas, besides being white, did not wish
to adopt both boys. D.'s foster mother, while willing to adopt both boys, lived in
Kansas City, within a few blocks from the boys' biological parents. Id.
39 Id.
140 Id. at 982.
141id.
142 Gloria

G., 833 P.2d at 982.
The trial court found that "sexual abuse," as defined in the Department's
Manual of Services to Children and Youth, could not have occurred. The definition
reads, in pertinent part, "An act of commission by a parent or caretakerwhich is not
accidental and harms or threatens to harm a child's physical or [sic] health or welfare."
Id. at 983 (emphasis added). The trial court determined that the acts of the Gozas'
daughter were not the acts of a parent or caretaker, and that the finding of sexual abuse
was inconsistent with the Department's regulation. Id.
4 Id. at 981.
143Id.

145id.
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prior to his placement and adoption. " Two 147
years later she amended
her petition, adding a claim on behalf of A.
The Department filed a motion to dismiss the claims, arguing
that its acts were immune from suit under Kansas statute section 756104(e), the discretionary function exception to the Kansas Tort
Claims Act. 141 The trial court denied the summary judgment motion,
noting that a reasonable inference could be drawn that the Department
had relied solely on race in making its decision not to place A. with
the Gozas, constituting impermissible racial discrimination. 149
Addressing A.'s claim that the Department's removal of A. from the
Gozas resulted in A.'s injuries, the trial court found the Department's
actions to be mechanical, rather than discretionary -- removing the
Department's acts from the protection of the discretionary function
exception. "5
Both Gloria G.'s and A.'s claims went to trial, with the jury
finding the Department at fault on both claims,"' and apportioning
damages accordingly."' The Department filed a motion for a new
trial and an amended judgment, claiming in part that the trial court
had failed to instruct the jury on the discretionary function immunity
issue."5 3 The trial court denied the Department's motions, noting that

'

Gloria G., 833 P.2d at 983.
Id. Gloria G., on behalf of A., alleged that A.'s emotional damage was caused
I47

by the Department.

She alleged that the Department had a duty to protect A.'s best

interests and had breached the duty by: "(1) denying the Gozas, based on race, the
possibility of adopting A.; and (2) removing A. from the Gozas [sic] home because of
an unsubstantiated report of sexual abuse." Id.
" Id. Discretionary function immunity is the equivalent of qualified immunity,
discussed supra note 104.
'4' Gloria G.,

833 P.2d at 983.

150Id.
"I Id. The jury ruled on Gloria G.'s claim that Gloria G. and the Department were
each 50% at fault. On A.'s claim the jury found the Department 30% at fault (fault was

assessed at 60% for A.'s biological parents, the Gozas at 5%, and their daughter at 5%).
Id.
'52 Id.

A.'s damages were assessed at $625,000, encompassing future medical

expenses, non-economic loss to date, and future economic and non-economic loss. The
trial court entered judgment against the Department for $187,000. (The appellate court
noted that 30% of $625,000 is actually $187,500, an error that remained uncorrected at
the time of the appeal). Id.
3

Gloria G., 833 P.2d at 984.
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the governmental immunity argument had been raised and addressed
in the Department's motion for summary judgment, and that the
discretionary function immunity issue was one for the court -- not the
jury -- thus, the immunity instruction was properly denied."
On appeal the Supreme Court of Kansas reversed the trial
court, holding that the Department was immune from suit under the
discretionary function exception.155 The Department claimed on
appeal that its decision to remove A. from the Gozas was based on
its confirmation of the incident of sexual abuse, and not because of
race. 156 The Department asserted that the decision
to remove A. was
157
immunity.
to
entitled
thus
and
discretionary,
A. raised two arguments on appeal, claiming that the
Department had not shown its entitlement to discretionary function
immunity."' A.'s first claim regarding the Department's fault was
that the Department had denied his adoption by the Gozas on the
basis of race."5 9 Secondly, A. contended that the Department was
negligent in removing A. from the Gozas, knowing that emotional
harm to A. would result. 1" On the basis of these two arguments, A.
claimed that the Department was not entitled to discretionary function
16 1
immunity.
The appellate court engaged in a lengthy analysis of
discretionary function immunity,162 concluding that "generally,
adoption placement involves the type of policy judgment inappropriate
for judicial review." 163 Addressing A. 's claim that the Department's
sole consideration in A.'s adoption placement was race, the court
declared "race was not [the Department's] only consideration; race

'

Id.

's

Id. at 988.
I' at 984.
Id.

157Id.
158Id.
'

Gloria G., 833 P.2d at 984.

160Id.
11

Id. A. claimed that the denial of adoption and the removal from the Gozas were

not discretionary acts, since the first act was a violation of a legal duty, and the second
was performed in spite of obvious harmful consequences. Id.
IQ Id. at 984-88.
"3 Id. at 986.
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was considered in A.'s best interest. "t1 Regarding the Department's
removal of A. after the incident of sexual manipulation, the court was
"not persuaded that the authority of [the Department] to act was
limited to those situations found in its guidelines defining sexual
abuse. "65 Noting that the Department's responsibility was to act in
the best interests of the children it was charged with protecting, the
court determined that the Department must be able to carry out its
responsibilities without regard to satisfying definitional criteria
contained in its guidelines."
Gloria G. is a very disappointing decision in terms of the
transracial adoption controversy.
The Department's same-race
matching plan for adoption of A. and his brother is troubling, even
absent other information. But the effect promoted by the racematching in the case of A. poses serious questions that should be
addressed.
The ramifications of race-matching policies affect
countless children -- children that will suffer far into the future as a
result of the agenda of the NABSW and courts that decline to invade
the province of foster care and adoption decision-makers. A.'s story
is quite troubling; while placement with an African-American or
biracial family was undoubtedly the optimal placement for the boys,
being subject to removal from the Department after having spent four
years as part of the Goza family cannot realistically be viewed as a
move in A.'s best interests.

' Gloria G., 833 P.2d at 986. The court noted the other factors that the
Department considered in forming adoption plans for the child: placing A. and his
brother together, outside the Kansas City area, with biracial or African-American
parents. The court also emphasized that the sexual manipulation incident involving the
Gozas' daughter led to A.'s removal, after adoption placement with the Gozas was
underway. Id.
'

Id. at 987.
SId.
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V. Influx of Minority Children Into the Foster Care System
The most tangible development of the mid-1980s affecting the
transracial adoption controversy was the number of minority children
that began to flood the foster care systems.167 The best figures
available indicate that an estimated 400,000 children are currently in
out-of-home placement; forty percent more than there were in
1982.168 This dramatic increase can be attributed to the rise of drug
and alcohol abuse, poverty, homelessness, and the inability of social
service programs to address growing demands on the system.169
A large portion of the increasing foster care population is
comprised of minority children."17 Currently these children represent
roughly half of the total foster care population.' 71 This ratio is
extremely disproportionate with the general population in this
country;1 72 approximately sixteen percent of the population is made
up of minorities and eighty-four percent is white.' 73 Highlighting the
plight of black children in need of homes is the much larger number
of white families who wish to adopt compared with the number of75
black families, 74 though actual figures are difficult to substantiate.1

167See

Bartholet, supranote 1, at 1173 and accompanying footnotes. See also Jerry

Thomas, 59 Black Babies to be Adopted, But PotentialParentsScarce, C1. TRIB., Apr.
30, 1991, at 1; Radin, supra note 49, at 1.
16 Bartholet, supra note 1, at 1173 and accompanying footnotes.
1 See Celia W. Dugger, Troubled Children Flood Ill-PreparedCare System, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 8, 1992, at Al ("New York City's child welfare system, like many others
across the nation, has been flooded with thousands of emotionally traumatized children,
products of families ruined by crack, AIDS, and homelessness."); Howard W. French,
Rise In Babies Hurt By Drugs Is Predicted, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1989, at B1, B2
(discussing causes of rise in number of infants in need of special services); Charisse
Jones, Drugs Cited as Cause of Crisis; Pleas Made for Adoptive Homes for Black
Children, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 1989, at 1. Adoption officials say that drug abuse is
particularly problematic for black children, because it serves to debilitate the extended
family network that has traditionally stepped in to care for them in times of need. Id.
170
See DISCARDED CHILDREN, supra note 2, at 38.
171Id.
172Id.
'" Total Population by Race: 1960 to 1989, in U.S. BuREAu OF THE CENsus;
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 12 (111th ed. 1991).
" See Radin, supra note 49, at 1 ("[Black] children are being born into a society
in which there are not enough black families waiting to care for them.").
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It is this inverse proportion of same-race children and same-race
families that has drawn1 76increasing attention to transracial adoption
policies in recent years.

A. Has the Numbers Increase Created
any Changes Regarding TRA?

Current foster care and adoption agency policies have not
shifted in response to the rise of minority children who need
placement. 77 Same-race matching policies remain a fundamental
tenet in child placement,"'8 often, as many argue, to the detriment of
black and other minority children.179 Most child placement agencies
have policies governing transracial placement.18 ° Generally, black

75See Bartholet, supra note 1, at 1187 and accompanying footnotes. Many adoption

and foster care experts feel that the amount of black families willing or able to adopt is
higher than figures show. Some reasons offered for the discrepancy in numbers are the
bureaucratic red tape involved in adoption that serves to discourage many blacks, and
agency criteria for adoptive parents that are aimed at white, middle class America and
disinclude many worthy black families. See infra notes 239-42 and accompanying text.
Additionally, "[b]lack adoption has, historically, been a matter of . . . 'informal'
adoption, whereby, a child is taken into a home [and] reared as one's own child, except
that it is never legalized in the courts." PreservingBlack Families: Research andAction
Beyond the Rhetoric, NAT'L ASs'N OF BLACK SOCIAL WORKERS ACTION LETTER (Nat'l
Ass'n of Black Social Workers, New York, N.Y.), Feb., 1986, at 33 [hereinafter
Preserving Black Families].
17 See, e.g., Jerry Thomas, Adoption Isn't As Simple As Black, White, CIE. TRIB.,
June 2, 1991, at 4 [hereinafter Adoption Isn't As Simple]; Radin, supra note 49, at 4;
D'Antonio, supra note 47, at 3, 27.
177See Radin, supra note 49, at 1 ("[Bllack social workers are adamantly, and
effectively, preventing their adoption into white families.").
" See Bartholet, supra note 1, at 1183.
17 Radin, supra note 49, at 39.
See also Jennifer Allen, The Controversy
Surrounding Rainbow Families, NEWSDAY (Nassau and Suffolk ed.), Oct. 7, 1990,
Magazine, at 12, 14.
150See, e.g., Nancy Stancill, The Baby Market; Policy of Racial Matching In
Adoptions Attacked, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 10, 1991, at Cl (discussing Texas
Department of Human Services' policy, which asserts that the Department "prefers
placement of children with adoptive parents whose race or ethnicity is the same as the
child's"); Barth, supra note 48, at 8 (discussing New York State requirement that an
agency "make an effort to place each child in a home as similar and compatible with his
or her ethnic, racial, religious, and cultural background as possible.").

1992]

TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION

171

and minority children cannot be placed in white families until all
other possibilities have been exhausted; i.e., until the agency
recognizes that there is no minority family available to adopt the child
or provide long term foster care."' Usually this decision is reached
only after the child has spent considerable time in institutions or has
been shuttled from one short term foster family to another."'
Many agencies have a policy that gives first preference to a
family that has cared for a child for at least twelve months if the
child becomes adoptable."' When it is a white family caring for a
black child, however, it is common for an agency to step in and
remove the child before the twelve month mark can be reached."
Such a practice relieves the agency from allowing the white family to
exercise the option to adopt, in keeping with strict agency opposition
to transracial adoptions.
While some agencies lack formal, written prohibitions against
TRA or preferences for same-race placement, firm unwritten agency
rules promote the same effects. 85
Often, child placement
caseworkers will actively discourage TRA, telling a white family that
they cannot adopt a black child, even when the child has been in the
white family's foster care for a considerable time or when there is no
other option for the child.1 6 In one case, a white Chicago couple had
a black baby girl in their care and had been told they would be able
to adopt her. 87 Caseworkers removed the baby after a few months
and placed her with a black foster care family.,8 This occurred at
a time when there were almost sixty black infants in Chicago needing

"S'See, e.g., Radin, supra note 49, at 38.
2 Id. at 39.
1

See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 167, at 4 (describing Chicago policy); Allen, supra

note 179, at 14 (discussing New York State policy); Ilene Barth, Another Child Torn
From Those Who Love Her, NEWSDAY (City ed.), Mar. 12, 1989, Ideas, at 8 (discussing
New York state policy) [hereinafter Child Torn]; Barth, supra note 48, at 1 (discussing
New York state policy).
t See Barth, supra note 48, at 8; Child Torn, supra note 183, at 8.
1 See Bartholet, supra note 1, at 1183 and accompanying footnotes.
18 See Adoption Isn't As Simple, supra note 176, at 1, 4; Radin, supra note 49, at
4.
"g

Adoption Isn't As Simple, supra note 176, at 1.
Id.
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homes. 8 9 Examples like this illustrate how unyielding caseworkers
and agencies can be regarding same-race placement, and why it is
difficult for a white couple to adopt a black child.
The only situation where racial matching of families and
children has been suspended is in the area of emergency foster
care.' 9 "Boarder babies," as they have been tagged, are infants
whose parents cannot care for them due to drug abuse, poverty, or
illness. 9 ' In an effort to keep these babies out of hospitals where
they had remained for long periods of time, foster care agencies
began instituting emergency programs in which the babies were
placed with families for short term care.'92 Problems have arisen
when short term care stretches into long term care. Families grow
attached to the infants and often seek to keep them, either in their
continuing foster care or via adoption.'9 Due to the policies of most
agencies, these requests are routinely denied when the family is white
and the baby is black. "
The rigid stance most agencies continue to take against TRA
and foster care has come under fire in the media, with headlines
95
proclaiming: "Another Child Torn From Those Who Love Her"
and "Sad Goodbye to Michael." 1 9' Agencies defend their same-race
matching policies by relying on the arguments of the NABSW and
other black organizations, whom they are loath to offend. 1 97 The
Id. at 4. See also Thomas, supra note 167, at 1.
'g See D'Antonio, supra note 47, at 3 (discussing Long Island's Little Flower
Children's Services' program).
'91 Id. The boarder baby epidemic appears to be worsening. 'According to a study
conducted by the Child Welfare League of America and the National Association of
Public Hospitals, 43 hospitals in New York City together held an average of 300 boarder
babies per month in the first quarter of 1992. Moreover, 88% of the 607 boarder babies
studied in 12 major cities were exposed to drugs or alcohol in utero, an increase of 17%
from a study performed one year earlier. See "Boarder Babies' Running Up Big Tabs
At Hospitals, THE ATLANTA J.AND CONST., June 24, 1992, at A4.
192 D'Antonio, supra note 47, at 3.
19 See, e.g., Barth, supra note 48, at 8; D'Antonio, supra note 47, at 3.
194See, e.g., D'Antonio, supra note 47, at 3.
'95See Barth, supra note 48, at 8.
1" See D'Antonio, supra note 47, at 3.
'" See, e.g., Sonia L. Nazario, Identity Crisis: When White Parents Adopt Black
Babies, Race Often Divides, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 1990, at 1; Radin, supra note 49,
at 39-40.
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NABSW tenaciously adheres to its twenty year-old policy which
declares transracial adoption unnecessary and harmful to black
children,198 contending that it is the child welfare system and not
opposition to transracial adoption that is responsible for the problems
facing black children in foster care. 199
In addition to claims that black children placed with white
families are cut off from their cultural heritage and fail to learn
coping mechanisms for dealing with a racially biased society,
agencies focus on potential problems a black child may encounter in
a white family upon reaching adolescence. 2' TRA opponents argue
that the teenage years bring confusion, a sense of isolation, and anger
for black children that are adopted by white families.2" 1 Evidence of
such problems, however, is not supported by any'systematically
collected data. 2" Foster care and adoption experts tend to rely
instead on anecdotal evidence and their own perceptions of what
happens in transracial child placement.203
Many recent studies indicate the exact opposite of what
transracial adoption opponents contend -- that black children raised
in white families are no more troubled than children raised
inracially. 2° Transracially adopted children have a level of selfesteem comparable to that of inracially adopted children and the
general population.2 5 The children deal well with their adoptive
families and perceive their relationships with their families no
differently than other children. 2"6 The third stage of a longitudinal

'w In a 1986 action paper the NABSW acknowledged the controversy engendered
by its position, yet went on to proclaim "[nlevertheless, NABSW herewith reaffirms its
position against transracial adoption and continues to take a vehement stand against the
placement of Black children in white homes." Preserving Black Families, supra note
175, at 31.
199"The current system is weighted by an urgency to remove children from their
biological families, particularly Black children." Id.
200See Nazario, supra note 197, at 1.

201Id.

I See Radin, supra note 49, at 40.
2Id.

' See Bartholet, supra note 1, at 1207-26 for a thorough discussion of the major
studies undertaken to date.
20S

Id. at 1211-12.
Id. at 1215.

174

JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS

[Vol. X

study by Simon and Altstein indicates that the crisis transracial
adoption detractors predict will occur in adolescence is not grounded
in any evidence.2 °7 The study found that the percentage of families
with large-scale problems corresponds with figures reported for all
adoptive families.2° 8
Studies have shown that transracially adopted children have
positive attitudes toward race. 2°9 Contrary to the predictions of the
NABSW and adherents to its position, transracially adopted children
have as strong a sense of racial identity and pride as inracially
adopted black children.21 0 The children are reported as having better
relationships with whites than inracially raised black children and are
comfortable living a racially integrated lifestyle.2" This ability to
deal with the white world sets transracially adopted children apart
from their inracially adopted counterparts and accounts for many of
the concerns that transracial adoption opponents have.212
The ability of these children to function well in a
predominantly white society has prompted a barrage of criticism from
opponents of transracial adoption.213 Some charge that the children
live in an insulated world and will be unprepared to deal with the
problems that attend their racial identity as they enter adulthood.2 4
Another concern is that the advancement of blacks via a strong,

Id. at 1215 n.139 (reporting on research contained in RITA SIMON & HOWARD
ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADovTEEs AND THEIR FAMILIEs 108-09 (1987)).
s Bartholet, supra note 1, at 1211-16.
2o See generally id. at 1216-21. Shireman and Johnson instituted a longitudinal
study of transracially adopted children which compares various adjustment indicators for
transracially adopted black children with those of black children raised by single black
parents and traditional two-parent black families. The researchers report that at eight
years old, transracially adopted children "are maintaining their early good sense of racial
identity, but this identity is not intensifying as is that of the children in black homes."
Joan F. Shireman & Penny R. Johnson, A LongitudinalStudy of BiackAdoptions: Single
Parent, Transracial,and Traditional,J. Soc. WORK, 172, 175 (May-June 1986).
210Bartholet, supra note 1, at 1219-20.
211

Id.

22 See Radin, supra note 49, at 38-39.

See Bartholet, supra note 1, at 1215-20.
214 Id.
The National Association of Black Social Workers has asserted that

213

"[a]lthough many white families applying to adopt Black children probably can provide
loving homes and parenting skills, none of them can fulfill Black children's need to feel
positive about their Black identity." Preserving Black Families, supra note 175, at 36.
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politically involved and cohesive black community is threatened by
the facility of transracially adopted children to deal effectively and
naturally with whites.2"5 The fear is that assimilation into white
culture undermines a powerful black coalition dedicated to changing
racial inequality in our society.
Those that view transracial adoption positively point out that
transracially adopted children have unique advantages not shared by
inracially raised children, black or white. 217 The transracially adopted
children tend to feel comfortable in both black and white
communities.2 8 They have achieved what most people would agree
should be a goal for all children; the ability to deal with others
regardless of race. One young adult who was transracially adopted
as a baby echoes the sentiments of many when discussing what it was
like to be raised in an interracial family: "I felt like I had the best of
two worlds."219
4
Advocates of transracial adoption focus heavily on the
psychological damage that occurs when young children are deprived
of early parent-child bonding. 220 Experts are in accord regarding the
importance of a stable and continuous relationship between parent and
child in healthy child development.221 Proponents of transracial
adoption argue that undue concern with race matching can inhibit a
young child's development where the child remains in institutional
care over a long period or is frequently moved from one foster family

211 Preserving Black Families, supra note 175, at 36.
216 id.

217 Bartholet, supra note 1, at 1215-20.
218 id.

219Nazario, supra note 197, at 1.

2 Radin, supra note 49, at 39.
221See BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 126, at 31-32.

In this well

respected work the authors contend that "[c]ontinuity of relationships, surroundings and
environmental influence are essential for a child's normal development." Id. The
authors focus on the importance of the psychological parent-child relationship for the
healthy growth of a child. It is noted that a psychological parent does not have to be a
biological parent; adoptive parents or any other adult may fill this role in a child's life.

Id.
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to another. 222

Early and permanent child placement has been determined to
be essential to a child's adjustment to adoption. 2 3 Current policies
against transracial adoption severely hinder adoption or placement in
long term foster care for many black children, 2" which a majority of
child placement experts agree is more problematic for a child than
interracial family placement.22 While there is near unanimous accord
regarding same race placement as optimal, proponents of transracial
adoption argue than racial considerations should not be allowed to
interfere with a child's healthy development.226

m See, e.g., Radin, supra note 49, at 39; see also BEYoND THE BEST INTERESTS,
supra note 126, at 45. Goldstein proposes that "a child's placement be treated by agency
and court as a matter of urgency which gives consideration to a child's sense of time by
granting such cases a high priority by dealing with them rapidly, and by accelerating the
course of review and final decision." Id.
22 See Allen, supra note 179, at 14.
See Radin, supra note 49, at 39; Allen, supra note 179, at 14.
" Allen, supra note 179, at 14.
See e.g., Barth, supra note 48, at 8; D'Antonio, supra note 47, at 27.
Interestingly, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
disavows the stance taken by the NABSW. The NAACP's official policy regarding TRA
is as follows:
If there are black families available and suitable under the criteria of advancing
the "best interest of the child," black children should be placed with such black
families.
If black families are not available for placement of black children, transracial
adoption ought to be pursued as a viable and preferred alternative to keeping
such children in foster homes.
Memorandum from Benjamin L. Hooks, Executive Director, National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People to All NAACP Units, National Board Members and
NAACP/SCF Trustees 7 (June 3, 1992) (on file with the New York Law School Journal
of Human Rights).
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B. New Developments in Agency
Treatment of TransracialAdoption
While large-scale changes in agency policy regarding
transracial adoption and foster care have not occurred, important
steps are being taken to address the problems faced by minority
children in an overcrowded foster care system. National attention has
been focused on recruitment of black adoptive families.227 The One
Church, One Child program is a successful example of this expanded
emphasis on recruitment. 228 Begun as a partnership between the state
of Illinois and black churches within the state, the program uses
churches as a vehicle to communicate the need for adoptive families
to the black community.229 The program has branches across the
nation and many other organizations have been created to spread the
word and offer support and encouragement to potential black adoptive
families.23°
In Chicago, where there is a very large number of children
flooding the foster care system,231 more intensive state involvement
is being planned to address the problem.232 Money has been set aside
by the state specifically for the recruitment of black families. 2 " The
state is considering hiring black families that have adopted children

7 See, e.g., Wanted: Parentsfor Black Children Conference Held to Seek
Solutions, THE ATLANTA J. AND CONST., Aug. 21, 1992 at A3 (discussing series of
conferences sponsored by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to which
members of the black community were invited to "develop strategies and plans to go
back to their communities and increase the awareness of all the African-American
children waiting to be adopted"); County Launches BillboardAdoption Campaign, UPI,
Nov. 8, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (discussing Los Angeles
County ad campaign aimed at finding homes for children in need of adoption,
particularly minority children).
'

See James S. Bowen, Cultural Convergences and Divergences: The Nexus

Between Putative Afro-American Family Values and the Best Interests of the Child, 26
J. FAM. L. 487, 503 (1987-88).
22 Id. at 503.
0 See, e.g., Perry Lang, More Children, Fewer Homes: Crack Feeds Foster-Care
Crisis, S.F. CHRON. (final ed.), May 31, 1991, at Al.
231See Thomas, supra note 167, at 7 (estimating 23,000 children aged 2 to 18 in the
Illinois foster care system, 52% of whom are black).
232id.

233
Id.
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to help with recruiting other black families to do the same.234
Advertisements aimed at encouraging black families to adopt are also
scheduled.235 Chicago's Department of Children and Family Services
has instituted an ombudsman's program, where people can report
problems with city-run child placement programs.236
In addition to recruitment of black adoptive families, keeping
existing black families intact has become a priority for child welfare
agencies.237 Often this involves counseling parents with problems
while their children are placed in the temporary custody of a child
welfare agency. 23s
Many child placement experts agree that the traditional
screening criteria used to assess the fitness of a potential adoptive
family operates to the distinct disadvantage of blacks. 239 Agency
bureaucracy has also been targeted as intimidating potential black
adopters.24 With the increasing number of black children needing
placement and the national push to recruit black families, agencies
have been altering their criteria to facilitate inracial placement. 24
Single parents, older people, and lower socio-economic level adults
are now being allowed to adopt black children, exactly the2 categories
that have traditionally been avoided in child placement.
VI. Legislative Responses to CurrentProblems
Another incentive for black families to adopt are subsidies
available in most states to those who adopt "special needs" children,
which includes minority children, as well as the handicapped and

2 Id.
235

Id.
Adoption Isn't As Simple, supra note 176, at 4.

237 Id. See also Radin, supra note 49, at 38.

See, e.g., Adoption Isn't As Simple, supra note 176, at 4.
e.g., Jerry Thomas, Should White ParentsAdopt Black Children?, Clm.

L19 See,

TRB., June 23, 1991, at 2.
24 See Thomas, supra note 167, at 7.
24 See Allen, supra note 179, at 15.
2 Bartholet, supra note 1, at 1199-1200.
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These subsidies are matched by the federal
sibling groups."
government and are continued until a child reaches maturity. 2'
Federal reimbursement subsidies toward the cost of adoption are also
available in states with qualifying subsidy programs." s Subsidy
programs have proven successful in raising black adoptions." Often
a black foster family wishes to adopt a child, but without the foster
care stipend they receive they would be unable to afford to care for
the child.' 7 Adoption subsidies help bridge this gap in finances and
have become an important inducement to adoption.
The NABSW has proposed the Afro-American Child Welfare
Act, u" modeled after the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978.2 9
Designed to address the plight of black children who need family
placement, the proposed Act was created "[t]o establish standards for
the placement of Afro-American children in foster or adoptive homes,
to prevent the breakup of Afro-American families, and for other
purposes." 25 ° A central feature of the Act is its provision that
preferred placement of Afro-American children is with families of the
same racial heritage." 1 Other provisions include establishing
minimum federal standards for removing black children from their
families in order to preserve the existence of black families.252 The
Act calls for federal funding for child and family service programs
to help Afro-American families who need assistance253 and
establishment of an Afro-American Child Welfare Commission to
review cases where removal of black children from their biological
parents has been recommended. 2u
243Id.
24
4

at 1198.

Id.

Id. at 1198 n.88.

24 Allen, supra note 179, at 15.
27

Bowen, supra note 228, at 524.

AFRO-AMmICAN CHILD WELFARE AcT OF 1988 (proposed working draft),
reprinted in Bowen, supra note 228, at app.
249 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1988).
24

2'o AFRO-AMMCAN CHILD WELFARE ACT OF 1988 (proposed working draft),
reprinted in Bowen, supra note 228, at app.
2" Id. at Tit. I, § 105(a).
2'2 Id. at § 3.
23 Id. at Tit. II, § 202.
25 Bowen, supra note 228, at 523.
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A recent bill introduced in Congress, titled the Omnibus
Adoption Act of 1991,255 is a unique piece of bipartisan legislation
aimed at removing financial impediments to adoption and promoting
its wider use.256 While the bill does not specifically target the black
community, many of the Act's features will help with the problems
that black society faces when trying to adopt.257 The Act provides
refundable tax credits covering certain amounts of adoption expenses
for families, at certain income levels 258 and benefits for federal
employees and military personnel who wish to adopt.259 Under the
26
Act a National Advisory Council on Adoption would be established
and an adoption data collection service would be instituted.261
Among the proposed Act's more unusual provisions are those
focusing on education programs,262 including the establishment of
fellowships for graduate students in social work concerning the
effects of adoption 263 and funds to be allocated to states for creating
adoption education programs. 2' 4 The Act would also aid pregnant
women by providing for maternal health care265 and by allocating
money to be used to rehabilitate existing structures for use as
maternal housing facilities.266
According to Rep. Christopher Smith (R-N.J.), the bill's
sponsor, the Act will make "adoption more acceptable, more
available and more affordable."267 By focusing on education, the bill
is hoped to promote positive images regarding adoption. 28 The
Omnibus Adoption Act is receiving bipartisan support in Congress,

2" H.R. 1753, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
"' Joan Beck, A Bill That Would Give Adoptions A Welcome Boost, CmH. TRIB.
(North Sports Final Ed.), July 11, 1991, at 25.
257id.
2

H.R. 1753, 102d Cong., 1st sess. Tit. V (1991).

2" Id. at Tit. IV.
6

Id. at Tit. I.

26' Id. at Tit. II.

Id. at Tit. III.
Id. at Tit. III.
264 H.R. 1753, 102d Cong., 1st sess. Tit. I1 (1991).
Id. at Tit. VI.
Id. at Tit. VII.
2 Beck, supra note 256, at 25.
2 id.
20
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but has not yet been voted on.26 9
VII. A Fresh Perspective on
TransracialAdoption by Some Courts
The judiciary has begun to express more willingness to accept
transracial adoption., As increasing numbers of foster families are
fighting to adopt black children they have cared for and come to
love, 270 the courts have started focusing on the psychological bonds
that have formed between foster parents and foster children and are
2 71 McLaughlin v. Pernsley 272
paying less attention to racial issues.
is a primary example of the emerging openness of courts in dealing
with transracial adoption. In another case, a Houston court awarded
custody of a ten month old black baby to her white foster parents,
who had cared for her since she was four days old. 273 A black
professional couple had been approved by the county to adopt the
baby, but the court found that the psychological trauma of removing
the baby from her foster family was of greater concern than potential
problems she might encounter later as a black child raised by white
parents.274
Some courts are also addressing the special needs of
transracially adopted children by fashioning unique terms as a
condition to granting a petition for adoption. An Ohio Family Court
referee ordered that a white couple who wished to adopt their black
foster child undergo counseling and take courses in black culture

I

Bill status information, available in LEXIS, LEGIS library, BLTRCK file (Nov.
11, 1992).
1 See, e.g., Allen, supra note 179, at 14-15. As of March 1992, the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Civil Rights was investigating 27
cases brought by white couples who alleged discrimination based on race or ethnicity in
foster care and adoption placements. Lynne Duke, Couples Challenging Same-Race
Adoption Policies, WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 1992, at Al.
271 See generally BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 126, at 30.
See supra notes 85-99 and accompanying
272693 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
text.
2' Allen, supra note 179, at 15.
274 Id.
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before their petition for adoption was approved. 275 The novel terms
of the referee's order were part of a plan developed by the Hamilton
County, Ohio Department of Human Services to help white parents
foster a sense of black identity in their adopted children.276
A Milwaukee court approved a black mother's request that
two of her children be placed in a white middle-class foster family
instead of with the inner-city black family approved by the county.277
This is a clear departure from traditional initial foster care
placements, where preference is unwaveringly given to a same-race
family.

VIII. Conclusion: Are We Headed In The Right Direction?
The prospects for minority children in the foster care system
today are grim. The children typically spend considerable time in the
278
system before they are adopted or placed in long-term foster care;
some children remain in the system until they are released upon
reaching eighteen. 279 A concerted effort is needed to place these
children more quickly, in order to prevent them from growing up
with developmental and emotional problems that will effect their adult
lives.
The resurgence of interest in transracial adoption is a natural
outgrowth of an increasing number of black children needing homes
and not enough black families in a position to adopt them.28 °
Traditional opposition to transracial adoption has not abated.28 1
Alternatives like black recruitment and preservation of black families

75 Court Sets Terms For Whites Adopting Black, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 10, 1990, at

A13.
276 Id.

mid.
z Allen, supra note 179, at 14.
"t Id. at 16.
28o See Radin, supra note 49, at 39.
28' The weekly news program 60 Minutes recently devoted a segment to the
transracial adoption controversy. 60 Minutes.: As Simple as Black and White (CBS
television broadcast, Oct. 25, 1992). See also Nazario, supra note 197, for a fairly
negative view of transracial adoption.
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continue to be advocated and are receiving community support.2 2
Transracial adoption is slowly gaining more acceptance as the
foster care crisis continues. While few endorse the practice as a
panacea for the problem, the viability of transracial adoption as a
measure to fill in the gaps between the large number of black children
in the foster care system and the inadequate number of black families
available to take them is being realized.
The more public support and outrage that is generated toward
solving the foster care crisis, the faster the problem will be corrected.
Media stories, both in periodicals and on television, increase the
chances that the suffering of these children will be recognized. The
proposed Omnibus Adoption Act of 1991 is also extremely positive;
even more so because of its focus on adoption education and
subsidies.
Adoption and foster care agencies are taking steps to solve the
problems of black children that need placement. There are signs that
more attention is being directed at placing children in a good home
rather than only in a good same-race home. Increased state funding
in the form of subsidies and allocations for the recruitment of black
adoptive families have also helped.
Thoughtful judicial decisions in the area of transracial
adoption, along with innovative implementation orders, may prove to
be models for a compromise involving transracial adoption.
Collective and cohesive action will be needed to stem the problems
of black children in foster care. It will take time before the number
of black adoptive families procured through recruitment efforts is
sufficient to fill the needs of all the black children in the system.
While obviously of primary importance, since most experts agree
inracial placement for children is optimal, transracial adoption should
not be dismissed as an interim, stop-gap measure to alleviate the
problem.
Studies show that transracial adoption is not harmful to
children and does have positive, unique aspects.28 3 White families
willing to take in children in need should not be denied the
opportunity when a black family is not available.
Pohibiting
transracial adoption across the board and relying solely on black
2

See, e.g., Bowen, supra note 228, at 503.
See supra notes 204-226 and accompanying text.
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recruitment efforts to find homes for black children in the foster care
system is not a good response to the problem and is not in the best
interests of the children involved.
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